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ARTICLE
JUSTICE DELAYED?:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CIVIL
CASE DISPOSITION TIME
Michael Heiset
ABSTRACT
This Article addresses the need to understand better our civil
justice system by exploring possible determinants of disposition time
for civil cases that reach a jury trial. This study uses one year of civil
jury case outcomes from 45 of the nation's 75 most populous counties
and identifies locale as one important variable, along with certain case
types, results, and characteristics. An empirically moored under-
standing of the causes of case disposition time will assist public pol-
icy and reform efforts that seek to make civil justice speedier and, as
a consequence, more inexpensive and just. Findings from this study
call into question the efficacy of recent reform efforts that focus on
variables not found to influence civil case disposition time and ignore
other variables that exert systemic influence.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment guarantee to
a "speedy" trial speaks to the criminal justice system, specifically
criminal prosecutions and not to the civil justice system.' Indeed, no
comparable constitutional mandate guides our civil justice system.2
t Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. A.B., Stanford University; J.D.,
University of Chicago; Ph.D., Northwestern University. Michael Green, Ron J. Krotoszynski,
Jr., Dawn M. Chutkow, Daniel H. Cole, and Andrew R. Klein provided helpful comments on
earlier drafts. Brian Driscoll at Indiana University provided excellent research assistance.
1 See U.S. CONST. amend VI (reading, in pertinent part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .... ").
2 At the federal level, however, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure call for "the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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For civil trials the Constitution enshrines only the right to a jury.3
That the disposition time for too many civil cases that reach a trial is
not "speedy," or at least not "speedy enough," will surprise few. De-
lays have been characterized as "ceaseless and unremitting 4 and, as
such, present important challenges to the administration of civil jus-
tice.5 The average disposition time for a case that goes to trial in Cook
County Illinois, for example, is over five years. 6 Findings from this
study identify potential reasons for the frustration that often accom-
panies efforts to reform the civil justice system by reducing civil case
disposition time. It remains unclear whether variables frequently ad-
dressed by efforts to reform the civil justice system (e.g., whether a
case was referred to ADR) generate the desired outcomes. Moreover,
variables well beyond reformers' grasp (e.g., case types, locale, and
the number of parties) appear to influence case disposition time as
well.
The relation between case disposition time and civil justice goals
is straightforward.7 Prolonged case disposition time frequently corre-
lates with an increase in litigation costs8 and threatens evidentiary
quality as memories fade, evidence spoils, and witnesses and litigants
die.9 Delays in the resolution of civil disputes erode public confidence
in the civil justice system, disappoint and frustrate those seeking
3 See U.S. CONSr. amend. VII ("[Tihe right of a trial by jury shall be preserved....'). It
is important to note that the Seventh Amendment has not yet been made fully applicable to the
states. See Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years,
in VERDICT: ASSEsSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181, 236 n.3 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
Nevertheless, most state constitutions recognize a similar right. The application of the Seventh
Amendment is controversial. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Improving the Quality of Jury Deci-
sionmaking, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIviL JURY SYSTEM, supra, at 341. Moreover, the
Seventh Amendment's articulation of a right to a jury trial for all civil cases in excess of $20 is
not without controversy of its own. See generally Douglas W. Ell, The Right to an Incompetent
Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775
(1978); Thomas M. Jorde, The Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial of Antitrust Issues, 69
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1981).
4 See George L Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 527, 527 (1989) [hereinafter Private].
5 See Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the
1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233,240 (1996).
6 See infra Part IV.E (Table 5).
7 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L REV. 125,
147 (1990) (discussing the desire for prompt case disposition time within the bankruptcy con-
text).
8 It does not necessarily follow that increased case disposition time will generate in-
creased litigation costs. But, to the extent that attorneys charge clients by the hour, an increase
in case disposition time at the very least increases the opportunity for attorneys to engage in
billable work on behalf of a client.
9 See, e.g., Robert M. Lawless & Stephen P. Ferris, Professional Fees and Other Direct
Costs in Chapter 7 Business Liquidations, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1207, 1230-31 (1997) (arguing
that case disposition time is an important determinant of administrative costs associated with
bankruptcy).
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compensation through the legal system, and generate benefits for
those with the financial ability to withstand delays or otherwise bene-
fit from them.'0 Such factors, individually and collectively, under-
mine public faith and confidence in the ability of our civil justice
system to operate efficiently and, more importantly, equitably.
How long should it take to dispose of a civil case? Prior empiri-
cal research provides little information that might bear on this norma-
tive question. Two broad factors complicate the issue. First, the pecu-
liar qualities of individual cases complicate efforts to establish gener-
alizations about the "right" amount of disposition time for any par-
ticular case, especially at the pre-trial and trial stage." The scope and
complexity of factual and legal issues and the number of interested
parties vary from case to case, sometimes considerably. Also, in cer-
tain instances a case's complexity may reasonably warrant delays that
can involve not only months but also years. Second, even if some-
thing resembling a consensus did exist on appropriate case disposition
times, until recently, relatively few data were available to assist re-
search on the question. Consequently, few scholars have ventured into
this intellectual thicket.
1 2
Notwithstanding important gaps in the research literature, civil
justice reform efforts persist; 13 they reflect enduring concerns about
delay and excessive case disposition times in the civil justice system.
At least two broad reform approaches have emerged that seek to re-
duce disposition time. One approach, outlined by Professor George
Priest, recommends shifting to more bench trials and fewer jury trials.
Bench trials typically take less time than jury trials, thereby reducing
overall case disposition time at the margins. 14 More bench trials might
10 See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND ET AL, RAND REPORT: THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT
LmIANTs' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETLEMENT
CONFERENCES 17 (1989) (discussing the relationship between litigation cost and delay). See
generally Daniel J. Meador, A Perspective on Change in the Litigation System, 49 ALA. L. REV.
7, 15 (1997) (describing challenges confronting efforts to reform federal courts as "daunting");
Tom R. Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Resolution Procedures and Outcomes: Measurement
Problems and Possibilities, 66 DENY. U. L. REv. 419 (1989) (comparing issues of economy and
cost in alternative dispute resolution to traditional adjudication procedures).
11 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374,419 (1982) (arguing that
any discussion about whether "managerial" style judging reduces case disposition time neces-
sarily relies upon a consensus about how long cases "should" take).
12 As Professor Resnik notes, the research literature on the causes of case disposition
delay reveals relatively little on the subject at hand and more on the inherent difficulties of such
research. See id. at 420-21 n.178.
13 For a fuller discussion of this point as it specifically relates to state tort reform efforts,
see generally Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New
Empirical Evidence, 60 Oiuo ST. L.J. 315 (1999).
14 See George L. Priest, Justifying the Civil Jury, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 103, 131 [hereinafter Justifying]. It is important to note that Professor
Priest is not alone in this position. Earlier, seminal work by Hans Zeisel and others came to
20001
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
fuel further reductions in case disposition time by increasing pre-trial
settlement rates and thereby reducing the number of cases that wind
up going to trial. Typically, case disposition times for cases that settle
are less than that for those cases that reach full trial. Bench trials' in-
fluence on settlement rates flows from the assumption that they gen-
erate more predictable outcomes than jury trials. 15 Increased predict-
ability in trial outcomes increases parties' information. Increased in-
formation about trial outcomes ex ante should stimulate more effi-
cient negotiating and fuel case settlement rates. Professor Priest ad-
vances a law and economics rationale to support constraints on civil
jury jurisdiction, arguing that such an approach is among the more
promising ways to generate reductions in case disposition time." De-
spite its promise, this approach remains largely untested.
A second approach, one that reformers and policymakers thus far
have found more attractive, addresses the task of reducing civil case
disposition time from a process-oriented perspective. This process-
oriented perspective emphasizes more traditional case management
techniques along with alternative adjudicative mechanisms. In the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 ("CJRA"),17 Congress adopted a
process-oriented approach in its effort to improve "the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action," as called for by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.18
Reasons for enduring concerns about civil case disposition time
are numerous and complex. They include the blunt reality that we still
do not know very much about how the civil justice system operates.
In particular, our empirical knowledge base remains curiously under-
developed. Almost one decade ago, Professor Michael Saks raised the
provocative question: "Do we really know anything about the behav-
ior of the tort litigation system?"' 9 A slight variation of Professor
similar conclusions. See HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE COURT 71-81 (1959) (arguing that
trial time can be reduced by shifting cases from jury to bench trials); see also Carol J. De-
Frances & Marika F.X. Litras, Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 1996: Civil
Justice Survey of State Courts, 1996, (visited April 14, 2000) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjsl
pub/ascii/ctcvlc96.txt> (supporting Zeisel's conclusion).
15 The predictability of civil trial outcomes is receiving increased scholarly attention and
endures as a matter of some debate. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of
Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1997) [hereinafter Predictability] (arguing that
punitive damages correlate with compensatory damages); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are Punitive
Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rationale? A Comment on Eisenberg et al., 26
J. LEGAL STUDIES 663 (1997) (arguing that punitive damages might be random and not rational
even if related to compensatory damages).
16 See Justifying, supra note 14, at 131-32.
17 28 U.S.C. § 471-82 (1994).
18FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
19 Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litiga-
tion System--and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1149 (1992) (bemoaning the want of
empirical studies on the tort system).
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Saks' question could be usefully posed to another aspect of the civil
justice system as a whole. Specifically, do we really know anything
about what causes delays in civil cases that reach a jury trial?
The short answer is that, while we do know something about
what causes such delays, we do not know nearly enough. Regrettable
consequences flow from our limited knowledge base and a paucity of
data in this area. What we think we know along with what we do not
know impede public policy development as well as reform efforts
designed to improve civil justice in this country.20 A deeper and more
systematic understanding of the underlying civil justice system would
assist efforts seeking to decrease case disposition time.
A case's underlying substantive merits clearly influence its dis-
position time. However, that other variables also influence case dis-
position time is equally clear and not a new idea. 1 What has recently
changed is the increased availability of probative data that facilitate
empirical explorations of these and related questions. This Article
addresses the need to understand better our civil justice system by
empirically exploring possible determinants of case disposition time
for the subset of cases that reach a trial. Using one year of civil jury
trial outcomes from 45 of the nation's 75 most populous counties, this
study identifies variables that influence disposition time. Findings
from this study call into question the efficacy of traditional civil jus-
tice reform efforts that seek to decrease case disposition time through
case management techniques such as alternative dispute resolution
("ADR"). Referring cases to ADR emerges as a statistically signifi-
cant variable, but not in the predicted direction. That is, case partici-
pation in ADR correlates with longer instead of shorter case disposi-
tion times.22
In addition, a host of other variables that fall outside the reach of
traditional civil justice reform efforts emerge as statistically signifi-
cant influences on case disposition time. Notably, geography influ-
ences case disposition time.23 Various case types, principally profes-
sional malpractice cases, also emerge as significant. 24 The composi-
20 See, e.g., Merritt & Barry, supra note 13, at 398 (using empirical evidence to debunk
the myth of a tort crisis).
21 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes In Civil Rights
and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L. J. 1567, 1567 (1989) [hereinafter Litigation Models] (noting the
influences of "judge or jury bias, regional influence, the type of case, the quality of counsel, and
the nature and resources of plaintiffs and defendants"); Merritt & Barry, supra note 13, at 326-
31 (considering various variables influencing the outcomes and jury awards in product liability
and medical malpractice cases); Predictability, supra note 15, at 626-32 (discussing the rele-
vance of similar variables on punitive damages).
See infra Part V.C.
2' See infra Part V.D.
24 See infra Part V.A.
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tion and types of parties involved in a case influence its disposition
time. 5 Finally, an array of case characteristics, ranging from which
party wins to the presence of cross or counter claims, emerge as im-
portant.
2 6
Collectively, findings from this study suggest that civil case dis-
position time resists traditional reform efforts that focus on case man-
agement variables. Part II places the issue of civil justice delay into its
broader, historical context and briefly considers prior empirical re-
search efforts. Part I describes the data and relevant variables. Parts
IV and V present empirical evidence about case disposition time as
well as the variables presumed to influence it. The conclusion as-
sesses these findings and considers their implications for civil justice
policy and reform as well as avenues of further research.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME AS AN ENDURING PROBLEM IN CIVIL
JURY TRIALS
Disposition time for civil cases or, more specifically, undue de-
lay endures as a problem that hamstrings the administration of civil
justice.27 That delays persist despite well-intentioned reform efforts to
reduce them evidence the difficulties surrounding such reform efforts
as well as the problem's complexity. The problem remains under-
studied principally due to the relative scarcity of helpful data as well
as the research question's inherent complexities. The problem of un-
due delay (or certainly the perception of a problem) has prompted
serious and successive reform efforts, particularly since the late-
1950s. Efforts to assess the effects of such reforms on reducing case
disposition time generally fail to link, directly, components of reform
with any systematic effect on case disposition time.
29
A. Prior Empirical Research
One commentator observes that the "history of the relationship
between empirical research and the reform of civil procedure has
'5 See infra Part V.B.
26 See infra Part V.C.
27 For a historical perspective, see ZEIsEL, supra note 14, at xxiii-iv.
28 See Private, supra note 4, at 527.
29 See, e.g., THOMAS W. CHURCH, JR. ET AL., PRETRIAL DELAY: A REviEw AND
BmLiOGRAPHY 45 (1978) [hereinafter Delay] (describing the lack of empirical evidence for a
reduction in delay time with a litany of specific reform proposals); BARRY MAHONEY ET AL,
CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL COURTS: CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT AND DELAY REDUCTION IN
URBAN TRIAL COURTS 193 (1988) ("The pace of civil and criminal litigation is not clearly
correlated with the size of the court, population of the jurisdiction, composition of the caseload,
per-judge caseloads, or the percentages of cases that proceed to jury trial."); Private, supra note
4, at 529-30, 548-58.
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been one of alternating enthusiasm and disappointment. ' 30 The am-
bivalence that characterizes the relation between empirical research
and civil procedure is equally true, if not more so, for efforts to re-
form our civil justice system, particularly civil trials. Despite a spotty
relationship between empirical research and efforts to reform the civil
justice system, notable exceptions exist and more will likely
emerge. 31 These counter-examples notwithstanding, at this point little
comprehensive data exist that inform many civil justice reform efforts
and helpful, sophisticated statistical analyses are rare.32
1. RAND Evaluation of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
One recent and notable exception involves the CJRA.33 Ten dis-
trict courts denoted as "pilot" districts,34 selected by the Judicial Con-
ference, agreed to implement a case management plan that incorpo-
rated various reform measures that the Act deemed desirable? 5 These
measures included differential and early case management, complex
case monitoring, encouragement of cost-effective discovery as well as
informal resolution of discovery disputes, and, perhaps most notably,
the use of ADR referrals.36
Also notable was that the legislation included an evaluation
component.3 7 The evaluation sought to assess whether and, if so, how,
the CJRA achieved its stated goals of making the judicial system
more just, speedy, and inexpensive. At the request of the Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts, the RAND Corporation's Institute for
Civil Justice was asked to evaluate and report on the implementation
of the CJRA. The inclusion of the Act's evaluative dimension
prompted the selection of ten "control" district courts by the Judicial
Conference, with advice from RAND researchers.38 RAND's evalua-
30 Bryant G. Garth, Observations On An Uncomfortable Relationship: Civil Procedure
and Empirical Research, 49 ALA. L. REV. 103, 103 (1997) [hereinafter Observations].31 One major exception involves the RAND evaluation of the CJRA. See infra Part II.A.I.
32 See Merritt & Barry, supra note 13, at 317 ("Sophisticated analyses of recovery rates,
controlling for a variety of factors, have been virtually nonexistent.").
33 28 U.S.C. § 471-482 (1994).
34 The ten pilot district courts included the following: California (S), Delaware, Georgia
(N), New York (S), Oklahoma (W), Pennsylvania (E), Tennessee (W), Texas (S), Utah, and
Wisconsin (E). See James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of
Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REv. 17, 19 (1997)
(noting that the CJRA required federal courts to conduct self-study along with an independent
evaluation conducted by RAND's Institute for Civil Justice).
" See id. at 17-18.
'6 See id. at 20.
37 The Act calls for an independent study of the Act's efficacy. See id. at 18 (stating that
RAND's independent evaluation would focus on "pilot" district courts).
38 The ten control district courts included the following: Arizona, California (C), Florida
(N), Illinois (N), Indiana (N), Kentucky (E), Kentucky (V), Maryland, New York (E), and
Pennsylvania (M). See Kakalik, supra note 34, at 19.
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tion of the CJRA's pilot program represents the most recent large-
scale empirical study of this country's civil justice system.
The RAND report has already stimulated a lively debate in the
scholarly literature and makes clear that the Act's efficacy is mixed,
at best.39 RAND researchers concluded that, although particular case
management practices are associated with "significantly reduced time
to disposition, '4° as a whole the federal "CJRA pilot program, as the
package was implemented, had little effect on time to disposition...
,41 Notwithstanding the evaluation's influence over on-going legal
and policy debates, numerous factors handicap the scope of the
RAND report's results. Some factors relate to the particular research
design used, while others reflect difficulties incident to almost any
effort to study issues for which common metrics have not yet formed.
The pilot program's small sample size poses one important
problem. Regardless of its representativeness, an experimental group
limited to ten district courts impedes much formal statistical analysis,
thereby limiting the results' generalizability. Another set of factors
that limits the RAND evaluation flows from problems with the re-
search design. For example, the possibility that selection bias influ-
ences the pilot and control districts endures as a threat that cannot be
dismissed. The researchers' efforts to develop a representative control
group evidence their awareness of, and sensitivity to, critical research
design issues. The criteria used in the selection of the ten pilot dis-
tricts are not clear. Selection criteria for the control districts are also
vague.42 Sensitivity to research design issues aside, questions about
whether either the pilot or control group systematically vary from the
universe of federal district courts remain.
In addition, some doubts surround treatment effect issues. Nota-
bly, eighty-five percent of the judges in the pilot districts reported that
their participation in the CJRA pilot program did not alter their han-
dling of their caseloads.43 This fact might point to an array of conclu-
'9 For a thorough discussion of RAND's evaluation, see Symposium, Evaluation of the
Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REv. 1 (1997) (focusing on RAND's empirical evaluation
of the Civil Justice Reform Act).
40 Kakalik, supra note 34, at 18.
41 Id. at 41 (figure 3). Moreover, the researchers concluded that the CRA had similarly
little effect on such other outcomes as costs or attorneys' satisfaction or views of fairness. See
id. at39.
42 The researchers note that, "[u]sing several methods, we confirmed that the pilot and
[control] districts are comparable and adequately represent the range of districts in the United
States." Id. at 19.
43 See Jeffrey J. Connaughton, Judicial Accountability and the CJRA, 49 ALA. L. REV.
251, 253 (1997) ("When it comes to the way judges run their courtrooms, Congress can't make
them do what they don't want to do."); Carol M. Rice, The Civil Justice Reform Act Conference:
A Reporter's View, 49 ALA. L. REV. 265, 268 (1997) (arguing that federal judges were unre-
[Vol. 50:813
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sions, among them: (1) that judges ignored some of the CJRA's pro-
gram components, or (2) judicial practices have previously incorpo-
rated the very aspects that CJRA sought to promote. If either conclu-
sion is accurate it is little wonder that the RAND researchers found
unremarkable results.
Moreover, the RAND study assessed what amounts to a single
cross-section of the CJRA process. Consequently, the evaluation's
design does not benefit from pre- and post-test implementation data
and does not consider data spread over a series of different time
points.44 A comparison between a pilot district's pre- and post imple-
mentation data might better reveal whether and, if so, how a pilot
district's implementation of the CJRA policies influenced case dispo-
sition time. It is partly due to the absence of pre-implementation data
from the pilot districts that made a control group essential to RAND's
evaluation.45 Finally, RAND's five-year study might not be long
enough.46 "More time is usually preferable to less, principally because
data gathered over a significant amount of time might convey poten-
tial insights not readily apparent after a few years. This can be im-
portant where results might not present immediately. Given the insti-
tutions involved, civil justice reform is likely among those types of
activities that would benefit from an extensive evaluation period.
The absence of definitional consensus in key aspects of the re-
form program provides another challenge to the research design's
efficacy. Critical components of the CJRA program, notably ADR
and pre-trial proceedings, eluded a common definition.47 Accordingly,
judges in the ten pilot districts construed ADR programs in varying
sponsive to CJRA reform measures because many of them had already incorporated case man-
agement techniques).
44 For a more complete critique of this point, see Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing
Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221, 240 (1997) (arguing
that short term evaluations are untrustworthy because of the prejudicial hunches that lawyers
and judges have regarding litigation problems).
45 In fairness to the RAND researchers, however, it is likely that timing issues and budg-
etary limits (or both) precluded a more desirable research design.
46 RAND's evaluation began in January 1991, and ended in December 1995. See Kakaik,
supra note 34, at 21.
47 See Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Fussing About the Forum: Categories and Defini-
tions as Stakes in Professional Competition, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 285 (1996) (arguing that the
rules of mediation and arbitration continually change based upon the interests of those compet-
ing); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement, 53 U. Cn. L REv. 424,424 (1986) ("ADR has never had a unified theory to explain
what it accomplishes and how it works."); Observations, supra note 30, at 112 ('The conduct of
the process ... depends on who the mediators are, when they intervene in the process, and what
they do to try to produce settlements."); Rice, supra note 43, at 277-78 ("Mhe discussion of
ADR was confounded in part by differing perceptions and perhaps confusion about ADR.");
Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded
Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1296 (1998) (noting that ADR
takes a "variety of forms" in the United States).
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and, potentially, inconsistent ways. To their credit, the RAND re-
searchers were quite candid about this methodological problem and
its influence on interpreting the results.48
Setting aside any technical issues that limit the RAND study's
conclusions, the overall finding that the CJRA program did not sys-
tematically reduce case disposition time comports with the weight of
prior research. 49 An inability to reduce case disposition time vexes
many civil justice reform efforts. Professor Priest advances an eco-
nomic explanation and argues that the problem stems from a failure to
consider the interactive effects of court congestion and litigation vol-
ume.50 That is, even if civil justice reforms succeeded in reducing
case disposition time that result will fuel a corresponding increase in
litigation volume. The increased litigation volume will exert upward
pressure on case disposition time until a new equilibrium is estab-
lished.51 Such a consequence might easily escape detection. If nothing
else, the small number of empirical efforts to study case disposition
time, such as RAND's effort, evidences the significant difficulties
that surround such an endeavor.
III. DATA AND VARIABLES
A. Data
Analyses in this study draw on the most comprehensive collec-
tion of state civil justice data supplied by the very courts that report
the case outcomes. The data were gathered directly from the court
clerks' offices by the Civil Trial Court Network (CTCN), a project of
the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) and the U.S. Justice De-
partment's Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS).
The data derive from state courts of general jurisdiction and in-
volve two random samples of 45 of the nation's 75 most populous
counties.52 The cross-sectional sample53 draws on data from approxi-
4 See Kakalik, supra note 34, at 34-35 (noting that two different types of ADR programs
emerged and differences between the two types made pooling their data problematic).
4 See Private, supra note 4, at 537 ("[Vlirtually all studies of the litigation delay problem
have failed to discover a systematic effect of any reform initiative designed to reduce delay.").
" Specifically, Professor Priest notes the inverse relation between litigation delay and
volume. As trial delay increases, the expected value of the judgment decreases. Delay, thus,
increases the likelihood of settlement and reduces the likelihood of trial to judgment. Con-
versely, as delay decreases the expected value of a judgment increases. As its expected value
increase so too does the likelihood of litigation and its volume. See id. at 534. The cross-
sectional rather than longitudinal nature of the data set used in this study precludes an empirical
test of Priest's hypothesis.
" See id. at 537.
52 For a more complete description of the data and sampling issues, see U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 1992: [United States] (ICPSR 1996) (CD-ROM);
see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statisti-
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mately one-third of the entire 1990 U.S. population.54 The dataset in-
cludes a representative sample of 6,109 jury trials along with key in-
formation about each sampled case.
s5
Despite the civil jury trial sample's rich depth and breath, the
sample's limitations warrant note. One limitation flows from the
sample's focus on the nation's largest counties and state courts of
general jurisdiction. As a result of this focus, the data might not con-
vey those aspects of the civil justice system, if any, that are peculiar
to small counties or rural areas.56 Also, the sample's focus on state
courts renders unclear any implications for federal civil trials. 7
Another important limitation relates to the results' potential im-
plications for the much larger pool of civil cases. Only a small frac-
tion (3.5 percent) of civil actions proceeded to a trial disposition.58
Because so few cases filed wind up reaching trial, it is possible that
the relatively small number of civil jury cases-the focus of this
study-differs systematically from the larger pool of civil disputes
from which they emerge. Indeed, there are strong theoretical reasons
to expect certain differences generated by a selection effect.5 9 Expec-
tations theory predicts that objectively strong and weak civil cases
will settle or conclude prior to reaching a jury trial.60 Litigants that
cal Portrait, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 433, 434-45 (1996) [hereinafter Outcomes]; Eisenberg,
Predictability, supra note 15, at 632. In gathering data, the BJS used a two-stage stratified
sampling technique that is described in Carol J. DeFrances et al., Special Report: Civil Justice
Survey of State Courts, 1992: Contract Cases in Large Counties 8-9 (1996). For various techni-
cal reasons, analyses presented here use un-weighted data. Accordingly, inferences drawn from
the results should be done with care.
53 The time covered is fiscal year 1991-92 (or July 1, 1991, to June 30, 1992). See Out-
comes, supra note 52, at 434.
54See BUREAU OF THE CENsUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY AND CrrY DATA
BOOK 18 (1994).
55 See id. at 2-10. Of the 45 counties included in the full dataset, data on the key depend-
ent variable--civil jury trial time-were missing for two counties (Hartford County, CT, and
Philadelphia County, PA). Accordingly, these two counties were excluded from this study.
"6 Some scholars believe that civil jury trials in urban and non-urban settings differ. See,
e.g., Outcomes, supra note 52, at 440 ("We suspect that litigation rates are higher in urban
counties than in more rural areas.").
57 For a comparison of state and federal civil trials, see generally Outcomes, supra note
52.
58 Unreported results from analyses of the larger general civil survey reveal that only
approximately 3.5 percent of civil actions proceed to trial, either bench or jury. (Results from
this or any other unreported analysis are available from the author.) The 3.5 percent finding
comports with prior findings. See, e.g., Private, supra note 4, at 540-41 tbl.1 (noting that less
than 4.2 percent of all cases filed reached a civil jury in Cook County, fllinois, municipal courts
between 1958-73).
59 Professors Priest and Klein, among others, previously articulated this point. See gener-
ally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984); see also Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go To Trial?: An Empirical Study of
Predictions of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 315, 327 (1999) (identifying factors
that predict which tax cases go to trial).(A See Litigation Models, supra note 21, at 1571.
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take cases to trial do so partly because they can afford to pursue trial
litigation and, presumably, because they sense some reasonable level
of uncertainty-factual or legal-as to the case's outcome.61 The sub-
set of cases that withstand settlement negotiations, motions for di-
rected verdict and summary judgment, and other factors is more likely
comprised of cases whose underlying merit resides somewhere in the
"gray middle area." 62 The selection effect, then, generates a distribu-
tionally skewed subset of cases that reaches the trial stage. Put
slightly differently, the subset of cases included in this study-cases
that reach a jury trial-likely differ systematically from the universe
of civil actions.
The observation that the subset of cases that reach a jury trial is
likely to vary systematically from the larger pool of civil cases filed
holds possible implications for certain outcomes, including disposi-
tion time. Cases that reach the trial stage usually last longer than cases
resolved without a trial. Factual or legal uncertainty clouds ex ante
assessments of liability risk, fuels litigation, and contributes to longer
trials and related pre-trial activity. Consequently, variables that
emerge as strong correlates of disposition time for civil cases that are
tried to juries may or may not help explain disposition time for those
civil cases that do not wind up going to trial.
B. Variables
A rough consensus about the appropriate disposition of time for
different types of civil cases may never be achieved. Even so, hy-
potheses abound endeavoring to explain sources of delay in case dis-
position time. The explanatory variables considered in this study fall
into four broad groups: case types, party types, case characteristics,
and locale.63 Further subdivisions are made within each group.
61 That plaintiffs prevailed in just over the expected 50 percent of jury trials (50.1 percent)
supports Eisenberg's general point. See id.
62 id.
63 Through data gathering (and subsequent statistical manipulation) more than 100 vari-
ables were generated, though most were different formulations of the same types of variable.
Multicollinearity tests were used to identify collinearity or, put more specifically, co-
variation among independent variables. Substantial collinearity among independent variables in
a regression model is problematic as it can affect the size and stability of the standard errors,
thereby undermining the reliability and accuracy of the affected independent variables' esti-
mates. For a more complete discussion see, for example, DAVID C. BALDUs & JAMES W. L.
COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION § 8A.1 (1980) (discussing the problems in-
volved in variable selection).
A two-fold approach to guard against multicollinearity was implemented. First, for
every model presented, we generated bivariate correlation matrices for all independent vari-
ables. No firm single "rule" exists within the literature regarding an unacceptable level of bi-
variate correlation. See, e.g., GEORGE W. BOHRNSTEDT & DAVID KNOKE, STATISTICS FOR
SOCIAL DATA ANALYSIS 407 (2d ed. 1988) (suggesting exclusion of variables where coeffi-
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1. Case Types
The legal and factual complexity of each case influences its dis-
position time. At the general legal area level (tort, contract, and prop-
erty) little exists either practically or theoretically to suggest which
area might spawn more or less complicated and more or less time-
consuming litigation.64 Cases involving more complicated areas of the
law or more specialized expertise should, on average, take longer than
their less complicated counterparts to resolve. Difficult causation is-
sues frequently increase a case's complexity. At the individual case
type level, tentative and broad generalizations about a case's potential
complexity are somewhat easier to advance. Examples of case types
with typically more difficult factual or legal issues include legal and
medical malpractice, toxic tort, and products liability. In contrast,
case types more likely to generate less complicated litigation include
automobile accidents and intentional torts.
2. Party Types
The types of plaintiffs and defendants and their number should
also influence the amount of time it takes to complete a civil case.
Many scholars assume that a party's status as either an individual or
non-individual (notably a business)65 is one-although admittedly
crude-proxy for wealth.66 It is further assumed that parties with
more wealth are able to litigate with more vigor and thoroughness, as
well as over a longer period of time. Cases involving individuals were
compared with those involving non-individuals in this study. It is as-
sumed that as the number of parties increases, especially defendants,
the trial's overall complexity increases as well. 67 Similar to the argu-
cients exceed 50 percent); MICHAEL 0. 'INKELSTEiN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR
LAWYERS 352 (1990) ("A simple (but not foolproof) test for multicollinearity involves looking
for high correlations (e.g., in excess of 0.9) in pairs of explanatory variables ...."); MICHAEL S.
LEWIS-BECK, APPLIED REGRESSION: AN INTRODUCTION 60 (1980) ('For diagnosis, we must
look directly at the intercorrelation of the independent variables. A frequent practice is to ex-
amine the bivariate correlations among the independent variables, looking for coefficients of
about .8, or larger."). In this study the more conservative approach was adopted in every in-
stance. Thus, where two potential independent variables' coefficients exceeded 50 percent, we
excluded one of the related variables. Second, even where coefficients did not exceed the 50
percent threshold, variables were excluded if two or more were intended to serve as a proxy for
the same idea or where, in theory, two variables were too closely linked.
64 See infra Part IV.A (Table 1) for a description of the case types included in this study.
65 For coding purposes, in this study plaintiffs and defendants were coded as either an
individual or non-individual. Non-individual parties include: businesses, hospitals, and govern-
ments.
6 See, e.g., Predictability, supra note 15, at 639 (discussing defendants' status as a non-
individual as a proxy for wealth).
67 The number of defendants named in a civil complaint frequently is not the same as the
number of defendants that actually defend a case at trial. Therefore, the number of defendants
present at trial is an admittedly crude proxy for case complexity.
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ments advanced with respect to case types, increases in case com-
plexity due to the number of parties involved will increase disposition
time.
68
In addition to increased complexity, defendants in certain cases
possess peculiar incentives for mounting particularly robust defenses.
For example, multiple defendants would be especially interested to
litigate vigorously in states that impose joint and several liability re-
gardless of comparative fault.69 Also, institutional (typically corpo-
rate) parties defending against certain types of cases-such as prod-
ucts liability-might be especially motivated to defend vigorously
due to the legal and economic consequences from an adverse outcome
in any particular case that might implicate potential litigation in the
future. Cases involving defendants motivated to defend vigorously
will likely take longer.
3. Case Characteristics
Other factors should also influence the disposition time of civil
cases. These factors, while significant in their own right, do not share
a common theme or organizing principle. Thus, they are grouped to-
gether in this study under the generic heading "case characteristics."
In this regard variables that signal when a: (1) plaintiff wins, (2) party
files cross claims or counter claims, and (3) case is referred to ADR,
capture aspects that plausibly influence a case's disposition time.
4. Locale
Variations in disposition time are frequently ascribed to locale
or, more specifically, "local legal culture." 70 As Professor Eisenberg
notes, at first glance a theoretical explanation for the influence of ge-
68 See generally Kenneth Abraham & Paul Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the
Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARv. L. REV. 381, 406 (1994)
("[W]henever arriving at a settlement depends on securing the agreement of each of a number of
defendants, the prospect of settlement is reduced ...."); Anne D. Weber, Misery Loves Com-
pany: Spreading the Costs of CERCLA Cleanup, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1469, 1471 n.12 (1989)
(citing cases in which "the government fear[ed] that increasing the number of defendants
[would] delay the trial or settlement....").
69 A state's type of partial settlement credit rule would also play an important, related role.
70 See Thomas Church Jr. et al., JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN
TRIAL COURTs 54 (1978); see also Delay, supra note 29, at 53-54 (citing and discussing various
articles which analyze case-flow management in the courts). As a variable, "local legal culture"
remains in some dispute. Compare Church, Civil Case Delay in State Trial Courts, 4 JuST. SYS.
J. 166, 181 (1978) (arguing that local legal culture can generate delays in case disposition), with
Joel B. Grossman et al., Measuring the Pace of Civil Litigation in Federal and State Trial
Courts, 65 JuDICATURE 86, 112 (1981) (arguing that "local legal culture," as a term, is more of
a restatement than an explanation of a problem).
[Vol. 50:813
CIVIL CASE DISPOSITION TIME
ography is thin.7' Notwithstanding any apparent lack of a theoretical
base, the influence of geography, and whatever that might entail, is a
consistent finding in the research literature.72 Some commentators
note that a geographic effect might necessarily follow from our
"large, federal system." 73 Geography appears to influence an array of
legal outcomes ranging from bankruptcy filings74 to civil rights.7 5
Other research suggests that the influence of locale on a legal system
is not limited to the United States. Even countries with unified legal
systems whose populations are thought to be more homogeneous,
such as Japan, Sweden, and Finland, exhibit geographical variations
in results produced by their legal systems.76 Indeed, some commen-
tators go so far as to note that it might be more of a surprise to find no
variation in outcomes among local jurisdictions.7 7 Even so, it remains
a distinct possibility that geography, as a variable, may reflect the
influences of other factors. Other possible factors include, for exam-
ple, how a county (or state) structures the relation between a court's
civil and criminal dockets and how lawyers might steer cases between
state and federal courts for tactical advantage.78 To test the local legal
culture hypothesis as well as control for geography's possible effects,
this study includes data on the county in which each case was tried.
IV. SUMMARY STATISTICS: OBSERVED PATTERNS OF CIVIL CASE
DISPOSITION TIME
The variables identified in Part III generate specific predictions
about the relations between those factors and case disposition time.
This section analyzes patterns of disposition time by isolating the re-
lations between each factor and disposition time (expressed in
months). Information about the sample of cases reaching a jury trial is
crucial to an understanding of factors that influence case disposition
time. Table 1 presents data on general characteristics, including in-
formation on the types of cases pursued, who pursued them, their re-
sults, along with other salient characteristics.
71 See Predictability, supra note 15, at 630-31 (discussing the relevance of geography to
punitive damages).
72 See id.
7 See id. at 631.
74 See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN El AL, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY
AND CONSUMER CREDrr IN A ERICA 339-40 (1989) (discussing the restructuring of the bank-
ruptcy system in many states and its effect on the number and types of cases being heard in the
courts).
7S See, e.g., Litigation Models, supra note 21, 1587-94 (1989) (examining the difference
between civil rights and tort success rates by region through the years 1978-1985).
76 See, e.g., Predictability, supra note 15, at 631 n.26.
77 See id. at 632 (stating that variation is expected).
78 Unfortunately, data on such more nuanced factors were not available for this study.
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A. Case Types
Tort cases dominate (77.4 percent) and property cases carve out
the smallest presence (2.5 percent) in the sample. Within the array of
different torts, those involving automobiles were almost twice as
common as the next most likely tort, premises liability. These find-
ings, particularly the influence of torts involving automobiles, com-
port with earlier case studies and empirical findings.79 Also notable is
the medical malpractice case finding. Although medical malpractice
reform garners sustained legislative, popular, and scholarly atten-
tion,80 malpractice cases account for only 11.2 percent of the civil
jury trial profile. Finally, the relatively small presence of contract
cases (20 percent), which includes business-related contract disputes,
warrants discussion. Certain case types are more likely than others to
involve a bench rather than a jury trial. In the business setting, for
example, the best available evidence suggests that bench trials domi-
nate.8' Thus, the frequent involvement of business parties in contract
cases helps explain contract cases' relatively small presence in the
sample of civil jury trials.
79 See, e.g., Justifying, supra note 14, at 119 thl.4-5 (finding that automobile-related cases
occupied over 63 percent ofjurors' time in a study of Cook County, Illinois, between 1959-79).
The dominance of automobile-related torts in the sample is such that the analyses pre-
sented in Part V.A (Table 6) were replicated after excluding automobile-related cases from the
sample. The unpublished results from the supplemental analyses generally comport with the
published results and evidence their overall stability.
go See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991) (advocating the
adoption of a no-fault program as an alternative to the current medical malpractice system);
Eleanor D. Kinney, Malpractice Reform in the 1990s: Past Disappointments, Future Success?,
20 J. HEALTH PoLrrtcs, POL'Y, AND LAW 99 (1995) (discussing the success and failures of first
and second generation malpractice reform); Thomas Metzloff, Understanding the Malpractice
Wars, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1169 (1993) (reviewing Weiler's book MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON
TRIAL). Also, various aspects of the medical malpractice debate have been the subject of law
review symposiums. See, e.g., Symposium, Medical Malpractice: Can the Private Sector Find
Relief., 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 5 (1986); Symposium, Medical Malpractice: Lessons for
Reform, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1991); Symposium, Medical Malpractice: External
Influences and Controls, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1997).
81 See Predictability, supra note 15, at 636 n.40 (noting that more than 50 percent of
contract cases are not heard by juries). Although the precise source of businesses' preference for
bench over jury trials is unclear, perceptions about uncertainty or unpredictability surrounding
jury decisions are a factor. See Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business
Decisions and Economic Outcomes, 1998 WisC. L. REv. 237, 246 (1998) (identifying juries as a
source of uncertainty and unpredictability for businesses and business planning).
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Table 1
Civil Jury Cases, by Type & Characteristic
(N) %
All Jury Cases 6,109 100.0
Case Types
Intentional Torts 233 3.8
Automobiles 1,988 32.5
Premises Liability 995 16.3
Med. Malpractice 684 11.2
Products Liability 179 2.9
Prof. Malpractice 99 1.6
Toxic Torts 63 1.0
Slander/Libel 34 0.6
(other tort) 455 7.4
(All Tort) 4,730 77.4
Fraud 828 13.6
Employment 184 3.0
(other contract) 212 3.5
(All Contract) 1,224 20.0
(All Property) 155 2.5
Party Types
Non-Indv. Plaintiff 824 13.3
Non-Indv. Defendant 4,213 68.6
Case Characteristics
Plaintiff Wins 3,050 50.1
Cross/Counter Claim 1,691 28.7
Referred to ADR 2,256 37.2
Source: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Civil Justice Survey of
State Courts, 1992: [United States] (ICPSR CDO012) (May, 1996).
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B. Party Types
Examining who sues whom, or the parties in civil litigation,
sheds helpful light on the question of what influences delays in case
disposition, especially if individuals and non-individuals might act in
different ways. The mix of litigation parties is also important as the
type of parties might also influence jury behavior. 82 At least numeri-
cally, in the civil trial setting individuals dominate, particularly as
plaintiffs. However, individuals are far less likely as defendants (31.3
percent).83 Consequently, civil jury trials more likely than not involve
individuals suing non-individuals.
84
Tables 2 and 3 present more detailed information on the parties'
involvement with the civil jury trials. The results in Table 2 comport
with the patterns suggested in Table 1, with one notable exception.
Almost all (94.9 percent) trials pursuing tort claims involve individual
plaintiffs. These individual plaintiffs seek compensation from a wider
mix of defendant types, with business defendants (46.3 percent)
emerging as the most popular. Not surprisingly, civil trials pursuing
contract claims display a stronger business presence both as plaintiffs
and, in particular, as defendants. Nevertheless, consistent with tort
claims, contract claims also typically involve individuals suing busi-
nesses. The exception to this trend involves trials over property
claims. In these cases (which, as Table 1 illustrates, account for only
2.5 percent of all trials) individuals play a far less numerically im-
portant role. Governments are the most common plaintiffs seeking
compensation. Most often these governmental units sue businesses.
Indeed, as Table 2 makes clear, within each category of civil cases
(torts, contract, and property) businesses consistently emerge as the
defendant of choice.
8 See, e.g., AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS:
WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985) (noting higher jury awards in cases involving
corporate defendants where type of harm is held constant). But see Merritt & Barry, supra note
13, at 392-94 (finding no evidence supporting the deep-pockets hypothesis in a study of prod-
ucts liability and medical malpractice decisions in Ohio). But even after finding no evidence to
support the deep-pickets hypothesis, the authors conclude that, "[a] defendant's institutional
status... is one of many factors that may affect liability in medical malpractice, product liabil-
ity, and other tort trials." Id. at 394.
s3 That the respective percentages, for example, 86.6 percent and 31.3 percent, when
added exceed 100 percent reflects multi-party litigation. For example, an individual suing on a
medical malpractice claim might decide to name as defendants an individual doctor as well as
that doctor's employing hospital. Under this study's coding scheme, individuals would be noted
as both plaintiffs and defendants, as well as an institutional (hospital) defendant.
4 Non-individuals include businesses, hospitals, and governments. See supra note 65.
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Table 2
Types of Parties, by Case Types (percentage)
(All) Torts Contr. Prop.
Party Types
Plaintiff
Indv. 86.6 94.9 62.4 25.8
Business 11.2 4.5 36.6 16.1
Govt. 1.9 0.4 0.7 58.1
Hospital 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0
Defendant
Indv. 31.3 34.0 21.1 31.0
Business 52.1 46.3 74.0 56.1
Govt. 7.6 8.8 2.8 12.3
Hospital 8.9 10.9 2.1 0.6
Note: Data for types of parties by case types available for 99.6% of all cases.
Source: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Civil Justice Survey of
State Courts, 1992: [United States] (ICPSR CD0012) (May, 1996).
Where Table 2 reveals what types of parties litigate what types
of claims, Table 3 presents data on the number of parties involved.
The data illustrate that the number of defendants typically exceeds the
number of plaintiffs in the civil lawsuits that reach trial. Plaintiffs in
over 90 percent of trials involve no more than two individuals or en-
tities. Almost two-thirds of all civil trials involve a single plaintiff. In
contrast, in just over one-third of civil jury trial cases did plaintiffs
sue only one defendant. Sixty percent of the trials involved between
two and ten defendants.
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Table 3 ,
Civil Jury Trials, by Number of Parties (percentage)
# of Parties Plaintiff Defendant
1 64.4 37.2
2 27.8 28.6
3 4.8 14.5
4 1.5 7.6
5-10 1.2 10.0
11-100 0.2 2.2
101+ 0.0 0.0
Note: Data for number of parties available for 99.9% of all cases.
Source: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Civil Justice Survey of
State Courts, 1992: [United States] (ICPSR CDO012) (May, 1996).
C. Case Characteristics
As Table 1 illustrates, the plaintiff win rate (50.1 percent) com-
ports well with what scholars and theory predict for cases that go to
trial.85 Notable, however, is-the variation of plaintiff win rates among
various case types. Mildly surprising is that cases are more likely to
be referred to ADR than involve a cross or counter claim filing. In-
85 See William Baxter, The Political Economy of Antitrust, in THE PoLmcAL ECONOMY
OF ANTrrausT 3, 16 (Robert D. Tollison ed., 1980); Priest & Klein, supra note 59, at 17 (argu-
ing that if parties have equal litigation costs and stakes and differ only in their beliefs about the
outcome, the results of litigated cases will approach an even split).
86 Although plaintiffs win civil lawsuits that reach a jury in approximately 50 percent of
the cases overall, unreported analyses reveal that defendants are more likely to win (more than
60 percent) in two of the more controversial and publicized case types: product liability and
medical malpractice. These unreported results comport with other findings. See, e.g., BRIAN J.
OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1993: A NATIONAL
PERSPECTrE FROM THE COURT STATIsTics PROJEcr 25 (1995) (finding that defendants won 70
percent of medical malpractice cases and 60 percent of product liability cases); BRIAN J.
OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1994: A NATIONAL
PERSPECTrv FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PRoJEcr 36 (1996) (same); John A. Goerdt et al.,
Civil Jury Trials and Awards, 19 STATE CT. L 23, 32 (1995) (finding that in 1992, business
defendants won 64 percent of medical malpractice cases and 63 percent of product liability
cases); Merritt & Barry, supra note 13, at 321-22 (noting the relatively "aggressive" plaintiff
win rates in products liability and medical malpractice cases in Franklin County, OH).
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deed, more than one-third (37.2 percent) of the cases in this study was
referred to an ADR program. Given the potential importance that
ADR poses for civil justice reform, its steady growth,' and the un-
certainty about its efficacy, it is prudent to explore whether and, if so,
how a case's referral to an ADR program influences its disposition
time.
D. Case Disposition Time
Figure 1 illustrates that, after peaking in year one, the number of
years it takes for civil cases to conclude declines smoothly and rela-
tively constantly over time. The right-side tail in Figure 1,8 however,
is considerable and Table 4 conveys its influence.
Figure 1
Civil Jury Case Disposition Time
40-
30-
% 20
10
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Years
Note: From case filing to trial jury verdict. Data for case disposi-
tion time available for 88.6% of all cases.
Source: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Civil
Justice Survey of State Courts, 1992: [United States] (ICPSR
CDO012) (May, 1996).
87 See Lieberman & Henry, supra note 47, at 424 (noting ADR's growth during the past
decade).
88 That is, cases that last a number of years.
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As Table 4 illustrates, the mean length of all civil cases that
reach a jury trial is just over two and one-half years (30.2 months).
The mean column also reveals variation between the several case
types as well as other case characteristics. Notably, mean disposition
times for medical (38.4 months) and professional malpractice (33.8
months) and toxic tort (35.8 months) cases exceed the overall mean.
To the extent that malpractice and toxic tort cases involve more com-
plex issues of law or fact (or both), the longer disposition times might
be expected. Although not formally reported in Table 4, malpractice
and toxic tort cases frequently involve non-individual defendants.8 9
As previously discussed, non-individuals, particularly corporate de-
fendants, are better positioned to absorb the additional cost that cases
with lengthier disposition times impose.90 Indeed, party type corre-
lates with case disposition time. Specifically, cases reaching a jury
trial involving non-individuals as either plaintiffs or defendants (or
both) typically lasted longer than the norm.91
Finally, certain case characteristics also correlate with disposi-
tion time. Cases referred by courts to ADR activities as well as cases
in which parties filed cross and counterclaims lasted longer, on aver-
age, than the mean for all cases. In contrast, cases in which the plain-
tiff prevailed took one and one-half months less to conclude.
89 Results from this unreported supplemental analysis are available upon request from the
author.
90 See Merritt & Barry, supra note 13, at 343 (arguing that within the products liability
context the corporate defendants--those that predominate such cases---"often have the re-
sources" to mount vigorous defenses); Predictability, supra note 15, at 639 (advancing the
assumption that business parties are more likely to benefit from greater access to wealth).
91 As Table 4 illustrates, mean case processing time for cases that involve non-individual
defendants (31.2 months) exceeds case processing time for all cases (30.2) by one month.
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Table 4
Case Disposition Time (in months) from Filing to
Jury Trial Verdict
(N) Mean Med. SD
All Jury Cases 5,432 30.2 25.3
Case Types
Intentional Torts
Automobiles
Premises Liability
Med. Malpractice
Products Liability
Prof. Malpractice
Slander/Libel
Toxic Torts
(other tort)
(All Tort)
Fraud
Employment
(other contract)
(All Contract)
(All Property)
Party Types
Non-Indv. Plaintiff
Non-Indv. Defendant
Case Characteristics
Plaintiff Wins
Cross/Counter Claim
Referred to ADR
215
1,834
874
576
168
85
31
31
382
4,196
751
169
192
1,112
124
30.0 23.8
27.2 22.3
30.4 25.4
38.4 34.6
31.8 29.5
33.8 28.6
26.4 24.8
35.8 35.9
31.0 26.1
30.2 25.2
29.0 24.9
31.2 25.5
32.4 27.2
29.9 25.5
30.8 28.2
720 30.6 27.1
3,678 31.2 26.4
2,679
1,541
2,086
28.7 24.0
32.9 28.5
31.8 26.9
Note: Data for case processing time available for 88.6% of all cases.
Source: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Civil Justice Survey of
State Courts, 1992: [United States) (ICPSR CDO012) (May, 1996).
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E. Locale
One common observation in the academic literature is that local
legal culture influences disposition time.92 Another observation is that
there is little intrinsic about locale to suggest why it might influence
disposition time. 93 As commentators note, the asserted hypothesis
lacks a fully developed and coherent theoretical footing94 and borders
on the tautological. Specifically, although locale tends to correlate
with disposition time, causation questions remain.96 Moreover, schol-
ars have not precisely identified the specific aspects that form a local
legal culture as it interacts with case disposition time.97 Similarly, no
one has explained why certain factors that speed up trials in one juris-
diction cannot influence trials in other jurisdictions. 98 Notwithstand-
ing the absence of clear theory to guide, the influence of local legal
culture has been noted in other contexts as well, most recently in the
area of punitive damages awards. 99
Table 5 presents disposition time data for each county surveyed.
The results show a locale's influence on disposition time and make
the local legal culture hypothesis more difficult to reject. Striking are
the ranges among counties.1°° By concluding civil cases that involve
trials in an average of 17.5 months Fairfax County, Virginia, is the
most expeditious county in the sample. With an average case disposi-
tion time exceeding five years Cook County, Illinois, occupies the
92 See, e.g., THOMAS W. CHURCH JR. ET AL, PRETRIAL DELAY: A REviEw AND Bm-
LIOGRAPHY 53-54 (1978) (noting several authors' assertions that local court differences affect
many aspects of a trial); BARRY MAHONEY Er AL, CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL COURTS:
CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT AND DELAY REDUCTION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 87-89 (1988)
(discussing a local trial court's influence on the pace of litigation). As a variable, "local legal
culture" remains in some dispute. Compare Thomas W. Church Jr., Civil Case Delay in State
Trial Courts, 4 JUsT. SYS. J. 166, 181 (1978) (arguing that local legal culture can generate de-
lays in case disposition), with Joel B. Grossman et al., Measuring the Pace of Civil Litigation in
Federal and State Trial Courts, 65 JUDICATURE 86, 112 (1981) (arguing that "local legal cul-
ture," as a term, is more of a restatement than an explanation of a problem).
93 See generally Litigation Models, supra note 21 (pointing out that arguments based on
locale cannot always explain differences in disposition time); Private, supra note 4 (discussing
the lack of understanding as to what particular aspects of each jurisdiction affect speed).
9 See Private, supra note 4, at 530-31 (discussing gaps in the research).
" See id. at 530.
96 SeeMi.
97 Although the necessary data are not available in this data set, it is plausible that locale
as a variable masks the possible influence of an array of such variables as: method of selecting
judges, individual case versus general call calendars, and the mix of criminal and civil cases
within any particular jurisdiction.
98 See Private, supra note 4, at 530.
99 See Predictability, supra note 15, at 630-32 (finding vast fluctuations in damage awards
depending on jurisdiction).
10o To further explore the stability of these results, Table 5 was replicated by collapsing the
counties by state. These unpublished results generally comport with those presented in Table 5.
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other extreme.'01 What makes these results even more striking is that
data for this study are drawn from a sample of the nation's 75 largest
counties. While important differences might distinguish the nation's
two or three most populous counties from the nation's 75th most
populous county, locale as used in the context of this study does not
illustrate differences between urban and rural counties. Indeed, be-
cause the data in this study are limited to the nation's largest counties,
it is unclear that local legal culture influences case disposition time in
non-urban settings and, if so, how.10 2
Table 5
Case Disposition Time (in months) from Filing to
Jury Trial Verdict: Locale
County (N) Mean Med. SD
(All Jury Cases) 5,432 30.2 25.3 17.5
Maricopa, AZ 144 21.2 20.0 7.7
Pima, AZ 78 22.5 21.1 10.8
Alameda, CA 87 48.2 55.2 16.7
Contra Costa, CA 68 33.8 28.5 19.6
Fresno, CA 85 27.2 21.4 16.0
Los Angeles, CA 298 26.4 20.9 16.0
Orange, CA 279 39.4 39.2 16.6
San Bernardino, CA 30 39.9 38.6 11.7
San Francisco, CA 107 34.7 31.9 17.7
Santa Clara, CA 98 33.2 28.3 16.6
Ventura, CA 73 40.2 37.5 19.1
Fairfield, CT 43 50.0 52.2 14.2
Dade, FL 112 21.7 19.1 12.4
Orange, FL 79 25.4 21.6 14.6
Palm Beach, FL 245 19.8 18.2 9.3
Fulton, GA 15 21.0 21.2 7.8
Honolulu, HI 50 22.9 22.4 5.7
Cook, IL 197 63.0 66.2 23.2
DuPage, IL 73 26.9 24.4 17.6
Marion, IN 26 26.2 26.0 10.7
Jefferson, KY 94 23.0 22.0 9.8
101 For practical purposes Cook County serves as an effective proxy for the City of Chi-
cago,02 To inspect whether any state-level factors might influence local legal culture, Table 5
was replicated for the 22 different states represented. The unreported results from this state-level
re-analysis comport generally with the findings at the county-level and presented in Table 5.
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County (N) Mean Med. SD
Essex, MA 75 46.3 42.1 20.5
Middlesex, MA 64 29.3 24.3 19.4
Norfolk, MA 59 30.6 19.3 22.1
Suffolk, MA 101 36.0 33.4 17.8
Worcester, MA 38 32.1 26.2 16.3
Oakland, MI 110 28.7 22.1 17.9
Wayne, MI 229 22.8 19.1 12.7
Hennepin, MN 181 21.8 20.6 10.3
St. Louis, MO 234 31.8 29.7 9.9
Bergen, NJ 114 37.4 36.5 9.4
Essex, NJ 151 41.5 42.1 8.9
Middlesex, NJ 127 38.5 38.1 9.9
New York, NY 13 48.8 45.1 27.8
Cuyahoga, OH 252 22.1 20.4 10.2
Franklin, OH 118 20.6 18.2 10.9
Allegheny, PA 80 33.4 26.0 21.0
Bexar, TX 251 23.1 20.2 10.5
Dallas, TX 245 26.2 23.4 13.2
Harris, TX 309 36.2 31.7 19.3
Fairfax, VA 159 17.5 13.5 8.7
King, WA 125 23.0 19.7 12.5
Milwaukee, WI 116 23.8 20.9 11.9
Note: Unweighted data for case processing time available for 88.6% of all cases.
Source: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Civil Justice Survey of
State Courts, 1992: [United States] (ICPSR CDO012) (May, 1996).
Noting that certain case types, party types, and case characteris-
tics in certain locales are likely, on average, to take longer than other
types of cases, contributes to a clearer picture of disposition time and
its possible influences. However, the purely descriptive nature of the
discussion thus far risks masking crucial interactions between vari-
ables. More probative are analyses that describe a variable's individ-
ual contribution to case disposition time, while simultaneously hold-
ing all other variables constant.
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V. MODELING CIVIL CASE DIsPOSITION TIME: RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
Guided by results from the descriptive analyses presented in Part
IV, Part V turns to a model for civil case disposition time and dis-
cusses results from multivariate regression analyses that explore the
model's efficacy. Table 6 presents results from the model in which
the continuous dependent variable-the number of months it took to
dispose of a civil case that reached a jury trial-is modeled as a func-
tion of four groups of independent variables: (1) case types, (2) party
types, (3) case characteristics, and (4) locale. (Although the model
includes dummy variables for each county, the coefficients are not
presented in Table 6.)103 Due to a slightly skewed distribution of re-
siduals, the dependent variable was re-scaled logarithmically.' °4
A. Case Types
Results presented in Table 6 largely refine earlier descriptive
results and provide mixed support for the case complexity hypothesis.
Support for the argument that more complex cases take more time is
found in two case types-those involving medical and professional
malpractice. Both case types, particularly the medical malpractice,
exert independent influence on case disposition time at statistically
significant levels. However, findings for the product liability and
toxic tort case types do not support the case complexity rationale.
Although the product liability variable at least points in the expected
direction,105 it does not achieve statistical significance. The finding
for the toxic tort variable, while similarly non-significant, points in a
direction opposite to what the complexity hypothesis suggests.
1D3 These unreported coefficients are available upon request. Forty-two county dummy
variables are included in the model. (One county (Middlesex County, MA) serves as the refer-
ence county and is therefore excluded as the model requires N-1 dummy variables). For a help-
ful general discussion about the use of dummy variables in regression models, see Melissa A.
Hardy, REGRESSION WrrH DUhmY VARIABLES (1993). Of those 42 dummy county variables 34
(80.9 percent) achieve statistical significance at the p < .05 level or higher. Of the 34 counties
that achieve statistical significance 15 (44.1 percent) signal that civil trials correlate with longer
case disposition time. Cook County (which includes Chicago) is an outlier and correlates
strongly with lengthier civil jury case disposition times. These findings support findings from
earlier empirical work. See, e.g., Predictability, supra note 15, at 640 n.49 (study of punitive
damages); Private, supra note 4, at 539-57 (study of Cook County).
104 To ensure greater data smoothing and increased random distribution of error coeffi-
cients, for the regression analysis the dependent variable was transformed by its natural log. As
a consequence, however, the data transformation makes interpretation of some of the results
presented in Table 6 more complicated.
105 That is, the coefficient is positive (0.04), indicating that a product liability case corre-
lates with an increase in civil jury case disposition time.
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One potential explanation for the unexpected direction (though
statistically insignificant) of the toxic tort variable involves the matu-
ration of the asbestos litigation.1 6 Many of the cases in the toxic tort
category involved asbestos. 7 Data for this study were drawn from
fiscal year 1991. By the 1990s much of the asbestos civil litigation
had reached a point in its development where many critical aspects,
particularly those involving causation, had become relatively settled.
Of course, an individual plaintiff must still litigate on the extent of
exposure as well as individual damages in order to recover. But, as
compared to the larger causation issues linking asbestos to particular
harms, the remaining issues are comparatively easy to resolve. Thus,
the increasing maturation of asbestos litigation may have contributed
to a decrease in asbestos case disposition time.
The influence of reputational interests might help explain the
statistically significant findings for the malpractice variables, and the
lack of significance for the other complex case types, including toxic
torts and products liability. Unlike the corporate entities frequently
implicated in toxic tort and products liability litigation,108 individuals
who provide professional services, such as doctors and lawyers, are
more likely to possess deeply held professional, economic, and per-
sonal interests in their professional reputations. For example, Profes-
sor Hyman notes that law firms act in a manner that seeks to enhance,
or at a minimum preserve, reputational capital, thereby imputing
value to it.109 Specifically, law firms endeavor to capitalize economi-
cally on their professional reputations by leveraging their reputational
asset in a manner that attracts clients and commands higher billing
rates.110 Presumably, the same behaviors are exhibited by medical
professionals and their groups, associations, and partnerships.
Not surprisingly, then, formal legal challenges to professionals'
competence to practice their craft strike at the core of these reputa-
tional interests. When such challenges are present in civil litigation
and the case winds up going to trial, the consequences of an adverse
106 I am indebted to Professors Michael Green and Andrew R. Klein for raising this possi-
bility to my attention.
107 See STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL, BUREAU JUST. STAT., CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE
COURTS, 1992: TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES 5 (1995).
108 Obviously, plaintiffs in malpractice lawsuits frequently name corporate entities in their
lawsuits along with individual doctors and lawyers. What distinguishes malpractice litigation is
that named defendants almost invariably include individuals.
109 See David A. Hyman, A Second Opinion on Second Opinions, 84 VA. L. REV. 1439,
1454 (1998) ("Firms have reputations of their own to safeguard.").
110 See id. at 1454-55 (describing client selection of lawyers partly as a function of lawyer
reputation); see also S. Elizabeth Wilbora & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Views from the Front:
A Dialog About the Corporate Law Firm, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1293, 1299-1302 (describing the
enhanced value of a law firm associate's time if the associate joins a prestigious corporate law
firm).
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ruling for doctors and lawyers rise."' Thus, doctors and lawyers de-
fending against malpractice claims possess an important reason to go
forward with trials that might be strong candidates for a negotiated
settlement in another context. As such, pre-trial settlements in this
context would occur less frequently than in other contexts. On aver-
age, disposition time for cases that resist settlement and proceed to
trial exceeds that of cases that settle.
A crucial variable-admittedly difficult to quantify-is the eco-
nomic value to a doctor or lawyer in seeking to vindicate reputational
interests or, put differently, "clear his or her name" in a malpractice
challenge. Setting aside for the moment any personal desire to protect
professional reputation, the potential economic consequences flowing
to a professional from a successful malpractice lawsuit likely increase
a lawyer's or doctor's desire to defend against malpractice claims
with particular force. Of course, it is true that non-individuals also
possess important reputational interests. Yet the nature of the reputa-
tional interests possessed by individuals such as doctors and lawyers
and companies (non-individuals) differ. Consequently, how different
types of parties defend against lawsuits that directly implicate reputa-
tional interests also differs.
The terms of many lawyers and doctors' malpractice insurance
coverage provide further evidence of their particular interest in "vin-
dicating" reputational interests through litigating, rather than by set-
tling malpractice claims prior to a trial on the merits. These insurance
terms also distinguish a professional's approach to protecting his/her
reputational capital from that of many non-individuals. Unlike many
liability insurance policies, where insurance companies carve out the
right to determine whether a particular insured should settle or liti-
gate," 2 many malpractice insurance policies require the consent of the
insured (e.g., the doctor or lawyer named in a malpractice lawsuit) to
settle a case.
113
11 This is especially true for doctors who practice in states that publish a registry of doc-
tors found liable for medical malpractice claims.
112 Insured individuals would be more than welcome to litigate such claims, but litigation
costs incurred through pursuit of that litigation would be excluded from general policy cover-
age.
113 See, e.g., Scott Stephens Thomas, Note, An Insurer's Right to Settle Versus Its Duty to
Defend Nonmeritorious Medical Malpractice Claims, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 545 (1995) (discussing
medical malpractice insurance policies); Shuster v. South Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians'
Prof'l Liab. Ins. Trust, 570 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (citing cases where an insur-
ance company was found to have acted in bad faith for settling a claim without the consent of
the insureds), aft'd, 591 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1992). Professor Baker makes the point that the re-
verse is true (that is, quick settlement is sought due to reputational concerns) for the typical
restaurant facing a food poisoning claim. See Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Conflicts and
Defense Lntyers: From Triangles to Tetrahedrons, 4 CoNN. INs. L.J. 101, 129-31 (1997).
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Table 6
Impact on Civil Case Disposition Time
Independent Variable B (Std. Error)
Case Types
Automobiles -.06 (.03)
Premises Liability -.03 (.04)
Med. Malpractice .21** (.04)
Products Liability .04 (.05)
Prof. Malpractice .15* (.06)
Slander/Libel -.08 (.09)
Toxic Torts -.08 (.09)
(other tort) .00 (.04)
Fraud -.03 (.04)
Employment .07 (.05)
(other contract) -.01 (.05)
(All Property) .05 (.06)
Party Types
Plaintiff Not an Indv. .01 (.02)
Defendant Not an Indv. .07** (.02)
Total Number of Plaintiffs .00 (.00)
Total Number of Defendants .01** (.00)
Case Characteristics
Plaintiff Wins -.03* (.01)
Cross/Counter Claim .10** (.02)
Referred to ADR .14** (.02)
(constant) 3.16** (.07)
R2 (adj.) .34
Std. Error .45
F-Stat 44.07**
N 5184
Source: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Civil Justice Survey of
State Courts, 1992: [United States] (ICPSR CDO012) (May, 1996).
[Dependent variable expressed as its natural log. Dummy variables for
each county included in the analyses but the coefficients are not reported.]
* p <.05. ** p <.ol.
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B. Party Types
Results from Table 6 illustrate that the type of party as well as
number of parties involved in a case influence disposition time. Spe-
cifically, a defendant's status as a non-individual'1 4 correlates with
longer trials. In addition, the number of defendants systematically
correlates with case disposition time. As predicted, an increase in the
number of defendants correlates with longer case disposition time.
The finding regarding defendant's status builds off the earlier
finding, presented in Table 2, that most civil jury trials involve indi-
viduals suing non-individuals, principally businesses and corpora-
tions. Non-individuals--especially corporate parties-possess, on
average, greater access than individuals to the economic resources
necessary to pursue litigation vigorously." 5 Those with greater access
to the wealth necessary to defend against a lawsuit are in a position to
litigate with more vigor and for a longer period of time. To the extent
that the assumption that wealth disparity distinguishes most individu-
als from most corporations holds, this helps to explain why a defen-
dant's status would influence case disposition time.
Paradoxically, the same wealth disparities that might give busi-
ness defendants an advantage when it comes to defending a lawsuit
might work against them during deliberations within the jury room.
Some research suggests that where plaintiffs prevail in a jury trial,
judgments.against business defendants exceed those imposed on their
non-business counterparts after holding the type of harm constant 
6
Overall, empirical evidence on the deep pocket hypothesis is
mixed." 7 Notwithstanding any empirical uncertainty, once a defen-
dant commits to pursuing a case to trial-particularly a business de-
fendant-those who fear a fight against jurors' biases might be more
inclined to litigate in a comprehensive manner. A more comprehen-
14 Recall that in this study plaintiffs and defendants were coded as either individuals or
non-individuals. Non-individual parties include businesses, hospitals, and governments.
11 See Predictability, supra note 15, at 639.
116 See generally CHN & PETERSON, supra note 82; see also Valerie P. Hans & M. David
Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual Wrongdoing, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 151,
163 (1989) (finding that jurors more likely to find liability against corporations than individuals
due to the jurors' perception that corporations better positioned to avoid harm); Robert J. Mac-
Coun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the "Deep-
Pockets" Hypothesis, 30 L & SOC'Y REV. 121 (1996). But see Merritt & Barry, supra note 13,
at 392-94 (finding no evidence supporting the deep-pockets hypothesis in a study of products
liability and medical malpractice decisions in Ohio). But even after finding no evidence to sup-
port the deep-pockets hypothesis, the authors conclude that "[a] defendant's institutional status
... is one of many factors that may affect liability in medical malpractice, product liability, and
other tort trials." Id. at 394.
117 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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sive defense will likely consume more time and lengthen case dispo-
sition time.
The types of lawsuits businesses frequently find themselves de-
fending against might provide additional incentive to litigate thor-
oughly. Non-individuals, particularly corporations, are far more likely
to be named as a defendant in a product liability lawsuit. In certain
cases the stakes may be such that a corporate defendant might be ex-
posed to a loss (in economic and non-economic terms) that far ex-
ceeds what the plaintiff stands to recover. For example, the conse-
quences to a defendant of losing some product liability lawsuits might
go far beyond liability to the original plaintiff. A corporation's loss to
any one plaintiff might expose that corporation to similar liability to
other potential plaintiffs also harmed by a product. Thus, with an eye
toward potential future plaintiffs, a defendant in a product liability
lawsuit might litigate far more comprehensively than is warranted by
the immediate legal challenge posed by any particular plaintiff.
As economic theory predicts, case disposition time increases
with the number of defendants. 1 8 An increase is expected where the
interests of named defendants are not perfectly aligned, and conflicts
among defendants arise. Conflicts should arise in several, as well as
joint and several, liability jurisdictions. In the former, comparative
fault assigned to one co-defendant will reduce liability to another de-
fendant. In the latter, one or more of the defendants might "benefit"
from a shallow financial pocket.
C. Case Characteristics
Results for all three case characteristics variables-plaintiff vic-
tory, the filing of a cross, counter, or third party claim, and ADR re-
ferral-achieve statistical significance. Of these three variables, only
the plaintiff victory variable correlates with a reduction in disposition
time.
Table 6 reveals that a plaintiff victory correlates with shorter
case disposition time. This finding makes the most sense when the
plaintiff is an individual and the defendant is a non-individual. The
argument presupposes that non-individual parties-especially corpo-
rate parties-are more experienced with the litigation setting, more
likely to be repeat players, and, therefore, more sophisticated in their
analyses of likelihood of success.1 19 These factors might also manifest
118 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
119 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 95, 97-124 (1974) (arguing that repeat players possess ad-
vantages with respect to bargaining, economies of scale, and specialized expertise).
[Vol. 50:813
CIVIL CASE DISPOSITION TIME
through the defendant's attorney. If so, non-individual defendants
(and their typically comparatively more sophisticated lawyers) might
have a keener sense than individual litigants about when to mitigate
losses and avoid a lengthier-than-necessary case presentation or trial
to minimize inflaming or antagonizing a jury.
However, equally plausible counter-arguments also exist. Plain-
tiffs ordinarily bear the initial evidentiary and procedural burdens in
civil litigation. To prevail, plaintiffs must succeed at all stages.
Moreover, in some cases defendants can win prior to even putting on
their evidence. These aspects, individually and collectively, illustrate
how a plaintiff win can take longer than a defendant victory. Finally,
economic aspects of civil litigation can also lengthen case disposition
time in cases where plaintiffs prevail.
Wealth-or access to wealth-is a critical factor that shapes a
plaintiff's access to the civil justice system. Plaintiffs lacking the eco-
nomic resources to fund a lawsuit are frequently forced to hire law-
yers on a contingency fee basis. Criticisms of the contingency fee
system aside, 20 it is clear that when considering whether to accept a
potential client's case on a contingency fee arrangement (and, in ef-
fect, fund the client's lawsuit) most private lawyers assess the prob-
ability of a plaintiff victory at trial (or, perhaps, in extracting a settle-
ment). 121 The results of such assessments and calculations relating to
the prospects for a plaintiff's victory, along with the range of a plain-
tiff's likely recovery, inform an attorney's decision about whether to
accept the client and pursue litigation.
As the strength of a plaintiff's case increases, so does the prob-
ability that the plaintiff will win at trial. As a plaintiff's potential for
success at trial increases, so too does the likelihood that the plaintiff
will successfully attract a lawyer and secure contingency fee financ-
ing for a lawsuit. This is especially true as the prospect for plaintiff
damages increases. When a plaintiff secures the financial backing of a
lawyer, or more likely a law firm, the economic differences between
the typical plaintiff (an individual) and defendant (a non-individual)
erode. Put differently, in such circumstances an "individual" plaintiff
benefiting from contingency fee financing begins to resemble a "non-
individual" in terms of financial resources. And, as previously dis-
"0 See, e.g., Symposium, Contingency Fee Financing of Litigation in America, 47
DEPAUL L. REv. 231 (1998).
121 See generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil
Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22 (1997) (analyzing factors that contingency fee lawyers con-
sider when deciding whether to take a case); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk- The Re-
turns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1998) (reviewing the role of
contingency fee arrangements in the legal system).
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cussed, results in Table 6 reveal that the presence of non-individuals
in civil litigation correlates with longer case disposition time.
As expected, a party's filing of a cross, counter, or third-party
claims (or any combination thereof) correlates with longer case dispo-
sition times. The filing of such additional litigation can reflect numer-
ous factors, including the legal issues' underlying complexity, rela-
tions between (or among) parties, and a party's willingness to "fight
back" in couit. Not surprisingly, such additional filings also typically
increase the number of parties involved in a case. Table 6 illustrates
that an increase in the number of defendants correlates with an in-
crease in case disposition time. The number of litigants and the likeli-
hood of additional filings relate in other ways as well. 22 Specifically,
as the number of parties involved in the litigation (defendants and
plaintiff) increases so, too, does the likelihood of cross and counter
claims. What is important, however, is that the presence of additional
filings exerts independent influence on case disposition time. That is,
the influence of additional filings persists even after controlling for
the number of parties involved.
Potentially surprising is the result for the ADR variable. Results
presented in Table 6 suggest that a case's referral to ADR increased
the case's disposition time in a statistically significant manner. Para-
doxically, among the principle rationales for ADR programs is a de-
sire to reduce the costs and delays associated with the formal legal
system, particularly trials. 23 However, blunting any surprise with this
finding is that it comports with prior empirical research on the effects
of ADR policies on civil trial disposition time,124 notwithstanding the
goals sought through ADR or its proponents' wishes.
The manner in which ADR is deployed in this study, however,
makes the finding that it correlates with increased rather than de-
creased disposition time far less surprising. First, as previously dis-
cussed, ADR can mean different things to different people.1lz Second,
analyses in this study draw from a sample of cases that reached the
jury trial stage. To the extent that ADR seeks partly to prevent costly
122 As previously discussed, although the relevant variables co-vary to some degree, they
do not do so in any way that suggests a potential problem with multicollinearity. Moreover, the
variables capture distinct facets for the model.
123 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science
Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. I. CoMP. L. 871, 880 (1997).
'24 See Kakalik, supra note 34, at 38 (noting that the absence of ADR's influence on time
or cost during RAND's evaluation of the CRA is "consistent with the results of prior empirical
research on court-related ADR"); Tyler, supra note 123, at 880 ("Unfortunately, the bad news is
that [ADR] does not produce aggregate economic savings for the courts.").
125 See supra Part ll.A.1 and related notes.
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jury trials 12 6 any ADR efforts employed in litigation included in this
study failed, by definition, to achieve this admittedly narrow goal.
Thus, to the extent that unsuccessful ADR contributes only an extra
step toward the resolution of a case then that it correlates with longer
cases is not surprising.1 27
Strong ADR proponents, however, advance the counterintuitive
argument that even participation in "unsuccessful" ADR12 8 programs
can generate time (and, by implication, cost) savings by streamlining
the subsequent trial through helping the parties focus their efforts and
narrow the scope of disputed terrain. 129 However plausible the argu-
ment might be in theory, results from this study offer no empirical
support. For cases in this sample, a case's referral to ADR correlates
with longer rather than shorter case disposition times.
D. Locale
Although their results are not presented in Table 6, dummy vari-
ables for locale were included in the regression equation for two main
reasons. First, prior empirical and qualitative work suggests a locale's
potential influence on disposition time. Second, to the extent that lo-
cale does influence case disposition time, its inclusion is important for
the completeness of the model as well as serving as an added control
variable. Thus, findings for other variables can be interpreted as ex-
isting independent of any influence generated by locale or local legal
culture.
Given the descriptive results presented in Table 5, it is not sur-
prising to find that many locales vary systematically with case dispo-
sition time. The regression equation used to generate the results pre-
sented in Table 6 included a dummy variable for each county. Over
eighty percent of the county variables achieve statistical significance,
evidencing locale's overall importance to understanding why some
cases take longer than others to resolve. Of those locales that have a
statistically significant effect on case disposition time, over 65 per-
cent correlate with a shorter disposition time. Thus, setting aside in-
126 See, e.g., Lieberman & Henry, supra note 47, at 426 (noting that among ADR's goals is
to "prevent legal disputes that would otherwise likely be brought to the courts").
127 See, e.g., Louis J. Weber, Jr., Court-Referred ADR and the Lawyer-Mediator: In Serv-
ice of Whom?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2113, 2115 (1993) (arguing that ADR requirements nested
within the traditional litigation framework are more properly viewed as an "add-on" procedure).
125 "Unsuccessful" ADR is defined here to mean that it did not prevent a trial.
129 See Kimberly M. Ruch-Alegant, Note, Markman: In Light of De Novo Review, Parties
to Patent Infringement Litigation Should Consider the ADR Option, 16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. &
TECH. J. 307, 308 (1998) (arguing that even where ADR failed to obviate the need for a trial it
could be used to facilitate the construction of the claim issue in a patent dispute).
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herent problems defining what the locale variable captures, the local
legal culture hypothesis should not be dismissed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Most civil justice reform efforts adopt a process-oriented ap-
proach and, regrettably, address variables that do not appear to influ-
ence trial disposition time. Paradoxically, to the extent that reform-
related policies such as ADR do exert an influence, their effects re-
main unclear. More problematic for present reform efforts, however,
is that the variables that appear to influence case disposition time,
especially locale, fall outside the reach of the conventional, process-
oriented reform efforts. Even the most carefully crafted civil justice
reforms typically have little direct control over the type of case filed,
the number of defendants involved, whether the defendant is an indi-
vidual or not, who wins, or whether cross or counter claims are filed.
Results from this study help explain why many reform efforts appear
unable to "speed up" cases that reach a civil jury trial and, in so do-
ing, erode the foundation upon which civil justice reform efforts ap-
proaching the problem of delays from a procedural perspective rest.
One implication is that where data and experience evidence an ap-
proach's inefficacy, it is perhaps an indication to explore alternative
approaches.
Before anything resembling firm conclusions are drawn, how-
ever, more empirical research is needed. This is particularly true if
data rather than impressions or anecdotes are to inform public policy
and reform efforts in the future. Deeper understandings about the civil
justice system in general and case disposition time in particular would
benefit from greater and more comprehensive study. Cross-sectional
data would contribute much, particularly as it bears on assessing Pro-
fessor Priest's congestion equilibrium hypothesis.1 30 Also, more data
from more jurisdictions over greater periods of time would supple-
ment the small but growing database.1 31 Moreover, data on litigants'
settlement activity would be especially useful principally because
over 95 percent of all civil cases filed never reach the trial stage. If
little is known about the universe of civil cases that go to trial, much
less is known about the comparatively larger universe of cases that
130 See supra notes 49-5 1, and accompanying text.
131 The Bureau of Justice Statistics promises to release a follow-up dataset in the near
future. Once available, the data will permit comparisons between civil cases in 1992 and their
1996 counterparts. Moreover, the 1996 dataset is larger. See generally CAROL J. DEFRANCES &
MARIKA F. X. LrrRAS, BUREAU JUST. STAT., CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1996:
CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996 (1999) (pre-release report using
the preliminary 1996 data set, also available on-line at: <http:llwww.ojp.usdoj.govlbjslpublasciil
ctcvlc96.txt>).
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settle prior to reaching trial. Information generated by such research
would increase our understanding of the underlying civil justice sys-
tem and assist reformers endeavoring to improve it by reducing dis-
position time for civil disputes.

